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Abstract

Traditionally, when a task is considered for automation it is a binary decision,
either the task was completely automated or it remains manual. Level of Automation
(LOA) is a departure from the tradition use of automation in cyber defense. When
a task is automated, it removes the human administrator from the performance of
the task, compromising their Situational Awareness (SA) of the state of the network.
When the administrator loses SA of the network performance and its current state,
failure recovery time becomes much longer. This is because the administrators must
orient themselves to the current state of the network at the time of failure and
determine the cause of the failure before repairs or supplemental operations can occur.
LOA attempts to mitigate this problem by keeping the administrator engaged in
network tasks along side the automation agent. Keeping the administrator aware of
both the automated system’s performance and the performance of the network, while
taking advantage of the automation system’s speed and the complex decision making
of the administrator. This research applies LOA to computer network defense during
cyber attacks. The goal is to find the most efficient LOA that keeps the administrator
engaged in the defense of the network while preserving efficiency. The LOA allows
the administrator to supplement and/or correct the automated system, while the
automated system handles the time sensitive events to keep the administrator from
being overwhelmed or the network from being compromised.
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This Theis is dedicated to my wife who endured my absence with loving patience and
to my lovely daughter, who made going home a delight.
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COGNITIVE AUGMENTATION FOR NETWORK DEFENSE

I.

Introduction

Network administrators have been trying to find a balance between security
and usability since computer networks were used in business transactions. In the
past, security was primarily maintained by network policies and configurations [7].
The network administrator maintained Situational Awareness (SA) on their network
because they were actively engaged in network operations. Currently, automated
systems monitor a vast majority of network operations and administrators monitor the
automated systems, removing them from directly interacting with network functions
and reducing their SA of the current network state [13][18][24].
The amount of information that computer networks produce is overwhelming
for network administrators. From the amount of information transmitted across the
network to the vast array of diagnostic information contained within the nodes of
the network, there is too much to sort through manually [7]. Information rapidly
increases during periods of elevated cyber attacks and information overload for the
network administrator is quickly reached at a time when human intervention is
required most [14]. To help the network administrator manage all of this information,
automated systems monitor, parse, record, act on, and present information to the
administrator. These systems include Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs), firewalls,
routers, packet scanners, among others [28]. Automation has created a time gap
between an event occurring and the administrators response to the alert. With the
speed networks operate, a time gap of a few minutes between alert and resolution can
cripple network operations ranging from minutes to days depending on recovery time.
1

An approach to closing this gap is to find a more effective way to include administrator
interaction with the automated system. This research focuses on determining the
most efficient balance of control between automated network systems and network
administrators.
Level of Automation (LOA) is a departure from the traditional use of automation.
Traditionally, when a task was being considered for automation the decision was
binary, either the task was fully automated or it remained manual. When the task is
fully automated it removes the human administrator from directly interacting with
the operation of the task which creates the out-of-the-loop performance issue [19][18].
LOA is not a new concept and has been applied to power plants, information
gathering, and Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) control [13][32][23]. This research
focuses on how adjusting the LOA impacts the network administrator’s performance.
The research goal is to determine what LOA would best preserve a network
administrator’s SA and performance during cyber attacks. These experiments will
look at administrator performance and SA as the LOA, workload, and interface
platform are varied. The research will show what LOA best divides the workload
among the administrator and Expert System (ES) and if that setting is interface
independent.
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II.

Literature Review

LOA has traditionally been applied to applications such as aviation, robotics,
information processing, and controlling multiple UAVs in flight [13]. This research
applies LOA and moves the administrator back into direct operation of the network
with the goal of increasing network SA.
2.1

Situational Awarness
SA is a subjective metric, biased on a person’s awareness of the environment.

Extensive research has been conducted on how to measure SA.

Dr.

Endsley

introduced the fundamental model of SA containing three levels; perception,
comprehension, and projection [12].

Level 1, perception is the gathering of

information about the environment and the variables that can effect its state. Without
a well formed and accurate perception of the environment the other levels will be
flawed and inaccurate. Level 2, comprehension is the sorting, combining, processing,
and interpretation of the information obtained during perception. During this level a
cognitive model of the current state of the environment is developed by the subject.
For this model to be accurate it must include all the important factors discovered
during perception. There is a constant flow of information from the perception level
that allows the subject to update their model state at the comprehension level. This
model is used to predict the environment’s future state; which is level 3, projection.
A 4th level is purposed by McGuinness and Foy called resolution [21]. Resolution
builds on level 3 by trying to find the optimal path to achieve a desired state change.
This model for representing SA provides a well defined structure for measuring SA
during this research and can be applied to both an human or automated system [17].
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2.2

Manual Network Defense
2.2.1

Configuration and Policies.

Before any active defense or monitoring systems are used, configuration and
policies are deployed to secure and harden networks against cyber threats [7][9][16].
Configurations are categorized in two major areas, physical and software. Physical
configurations can limit how many physical paths exist between the local network and
others including connection to other networks. This simplifies the later deployment of
additional network security systems. Proper software configuration can help further
secure the network by controlling what types of service requests the network will
respond to. An example of this are firewall configurations that stop ping, Secure
Shell (SSH), Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP), and File Transfer Protocol (FTP)
requests to portions of your network that are not designated to respond to these
requests and thereby eliminating a possible attack vector.
Network policies are instructions that outline human interaction with the network
and are used to keep network users and operators from performing actions that
circumvent network security [9]. Examples of common network policies are password
requirements to prevent easily broken passwords or a rule forbidding network users
from using personal storage devices to mitigate the spread of viruses.
Configurations and policies are necessary to secure a network but are not
sufficient by themselves to secure todays networks [9]. Policies and configurations are
labor intensive to change and cannot be adapted fast enough to counter a dynamic
cyber attacks.
2.2.2

Monitoring.

Manual network defense is rarely used to counter cyber attacks in real time.
The network administrator would not know the network is under attack until some
systems start malfunctioning or an anomaly is noticed during a history log review [6].
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At this point, the attack could have already been executed, and the administrator has
to recover and try to close the discovered attack vector. The benefit of having the
administrator directly interacting with the network is that they are already aware
of the network state before the attack happens. This could make recovery time
faster [18]. However, it would be more efficient if the network had the ability to
detect intruders and defend itself and the administrator could keep SA at the same
time.
2.3

Automated Network Defense
Automated systems can analyze more data faster and react much quicker than

a human administrator [9]. Network attackers utilize their own automated systems
to rapidly execute multiple attacks and move through the target network and cover
their tracks. Network defenders are forced to counter this capability by installing
automated systems as well. The result is the administrators primary responsibility
has shifted from network operations to monitoring the automated system.
2.3.1

Intrusion Detection Systems.

IDSs are used to monitor network traffic and look for patterns that might indicate
malicious intent [9]. When the IDS detects a possible network attack, it generates
an alert that contains the pertinent information on the network intrusion. That alert
can be sent to a number of other systems, like an email account or other automated
alert system, or it can be logged in a history file to be reviewed by the administrator.
A limiting factor to an IDS’s ability to detect attacks are the two main methods
used to analyze network traffic; anomaly and misuse detection [9]. Anomaly detection
compares known good logs of acceptable activities on the network to monitored traffic.
Administrator can defined rule sets to configure the IDS for custom activities that
are authorized or unauthorized on the network [9]. Misuse detection, or pattern
matching, uses static signature files, much like anti-virus programs, to detect common
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traffic patterns seen in network attacks. A limitation of this method is if a new attack
occurs that is not in the signature file, or if an attack is made to look like normal
network traffic, it can escape detection [9]. Encrypted traffic is another problem for
an IDS. IDSs work as packet sniffers so when network traffic is encrypted, the IDS
is not capable of examining the data in the traffic without the ability to decrypt
the traffic. The process of decryption is a resource intensive process and can violate
network security protocols [9]. An additional shortfall of the IDS is that it only
detects possible attacks, there is no mechanism for the IDS to take action on the
network to subvert the attack [9].
An IDS is primarily a forensic or analysis tool rather than a defense system [9].
The problem is most attacks happen too fast for a human to respond [7]. IDS alerts
are used by the network administrators to track attacks that have already happened,
focusing their efforts in places where intruders are most likely hiding and to identify
where the network is most vulnerable. It is much more efficient than scanning multiple
log files but still not the a timely enough response needed to defend a network from
today’s attackers.
2.3.2

Intrusion Prevention Systems.

Intrusion Prevention Systems (IPSs) are an extension of an IDS. They utilize
the same detection methods as an IDS and are susceptible to the same shortfalls
of those methods. The key difference is that IPSs are capable of taking action to
change the network to counter a network attack [9]. This new ability does not come
without its own deficiencies. An IPS can only act on network nodes that it has been
integrated with. IPSs are commonly integrated with other network defense systems,
like firewalls, but are less commonly integrated workstations or hardware with uncommon operating systems, introducing a vulnerability.
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2.3.3

Anti-Virus and Internet Security.

Both IDSs and IPSs focus on network traffic analysis and do not account for the
social engineering aspect of cyber attacks [20]. If a network users gets tricked into
installing a foreign program or into revealing their password, an attacker using their
credentials could bypass an IDS or IPS and install malicious code on the network. This
is where anti-virus and Internet security software come into effect [7]. These software
programs scan local hosts for malicious code and remove or quarantine infected files
that could allow remote access or data exfiltration from network assets.
2.3.4

Other Automated Network Defenses.

The one common failing automated network analysis and defense systems is that
they are not immune to error or failure. These systems are monitoring and reporting
on the status of the network but there are no systems monitoring the monitors, this is
traditional the administrators’ job. The human administrators then shifts their focus
to administrating and monitoring the automated systems instead of the operational
network [6]. These automated systems serve a vital function but the complete removal
of the administrator from the operational network degrades their ability to be effective
when the automation system fails.
2.4

Level of Automation and Human in the Loop
LOA is the introduction of automation to assist a human administrator in a

task rather than replacing them [25]. This can be a delicate balance because with too
much automation, the administrator’s task becomes that of monitoring the automated
system, which introduces the out-of-the-loop performance issue [19][11]. Automation
bias also becomes an issue when human administrators interact with automated
systems [10][29]. Automation bias sets in when a human operator stops relying on
their own knowledge and starts to defer decisions and enacting recommendations
made by an automated system with out cross checking the validity of those actions.
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With too little automation and the operator can quickly become overwhelmed. Both
conditions can have major drawbacks.
2.5

Human Vigilance and the Complacency Problems
Introducing automation in a system and relegating administrators to monitoring

automated systems for infrequent changes gives rise to the vigilance and complacency
problem [31].

Human administrators are not mentally equipped for vigilance

tasks [31]. The administrator will become complacent and assume that the system
is operating as designed and that leads to automation bias where the administrator
defers decisions to the automation system without checking to see if the actions is
the best course of action [22][8][26].
2.5.1

Full Automated Control : Monitoring.

In a fully automated network, the administrator is relegated to monitoring
the automated systems. As the operator interacts with the automated systems,
they can monitor status, alerts generated and actions taken on the network. The
automated system’s ability to react faster than a human operator gives it some
powerful advantages over a manually defended network [30]. As long as the automated
systems function correctly, the operator has high confidence that the network is
running as desired. Problems arise when the automated system fails and the operator
has to manage the network manually. Skill degradation can make the administrator
ineffective at manual control of network function [10][11]. Automation bias can
degrade an administrator’s ability to decide the best course of action in an event
where there is no automated recommendation. Administrator complacency can lead
to a undetected failure if the automated system fails to register it [19].
Research into human vigilance has shown that humans are ill suited to tasks like
monitoring a system for infrequent changes [31]. Automation can alleviate the burden
on the human administrator, however if the administrator just shifts what system they
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monitor the same issues are still present. The further removed the administrator is
from the decisions that affect the operation of the network the more likely automation
bias will occur [10][6]. Automation bias occurs when an administrator fails to undo
a automated system’s actions even in the event of information that is contrary to
the automated systems actions or recommendations. Automation bias can lead to
failures from the operator’s lack of vigilance in checking the automated system’s
actions and failing to recognize aberrant behavior because of unexpected behavior
from the automated system [29]. A classic example of this is a server failure and an
automated system that activates a backup server. The administrator is complacent
and trusts the automated system, the failure could go unnoticed until the backup
server fails as well.
When the automated system fails and forces the operator to manage the
network manually, out-of-the-loop performance becomes an issue along with skill
degradation [25][18]. The out-of-the-loop performance issues arise from the operator’s
separation from the network’s current state. The operator is slower to respond to
requests and alerts because they have to spend time familiarizing themselves with the
current network state before they can act efficiently on the network. Skill degradation
comes from their lack of practice with manual commands. The operator might forget
critical commands during a time sensitive operation or fail to run all the proper
actions due to their extended time not directly interacting with network.
2.5.2

Full Manual Control.

The extreme is full manual control of the network. This is not commonly used
in today’s enterprise level networks because of their size, scope, and complexity.
However, it can be implemented in a limited scope, because of legacy systems or
new systems that cannot integrate with existing automated systems. As the operator
becomes efficient with the new systems, their ability to administrate and deal with
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unexpected errors will improve. The benefit the operator gains through the direct
interaction with the system is they are familiar with the system’s operation, bugs, and
what normal operation looks like on a day-to-day basis. This, potentially, shortens
the time it takes to diagnose a problem and implement a fix [11][19]. The downside
is that as the complexity and/or information flow increase in a manually maintained
system it increases the chances that an operator will get overloaded, thus decreasing
their efficiency [30].
2.5.3

Partial Administrator Control: Levels of Automation.

Partial administrator control or LOA attempts to combine the benefit of
automation and administrator control. LOA has been applied to the nuclear power
field with the goal of increasing SA and reducing the out-of-the-loop performance
issues [13][19][11]. In a nuclear power plant, it is important to identify, track, and
correct problems quickly to ensure safe operations and continuous service. LOA has
the potential to provide the same benefit for cyber defense. Both types of systems
require operators to know system specific commands and/or actions to manually
operate the system as well as operators and administrators are required to monitor
the systems for infrequent status changes.
By keeping operators engaged in the operation of the network, their efficiency
will increase. Allowing the operator to engage and use commands directly on network
systems achieves this goal. Thus reducing the operator out-of-the-loop performance
issue and skill degradation. It can also reduce the human vigilance issue by breaking
up monitoring (vigilance) tasks with active tasks, and lead to an increased SA for
administrators.
As the future state of warfare relies heavily on cyber assets and our enemies
and allies continue to gain experience and new technologies in this field. We need
to continue to develop new and better methods to defend our critical assets. As we
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continue to employ new technology throughout the country, our computer networks
are becoming a gateway to all of our vital infrastructure and have to be defended [5].
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III.

3.1

Methodology

Research Question
There is little in-line interaction of automated systems and human administra-

tors. Because of the this separation between the human administrator and the active
network nodes, issues like automation bias, skill degradation, and out-of-the-loop performance become a problem. This research presents a method to allow automated
systems and human administrators to interact side-by-side on the network to help
alleviate these issues.
3.2

Approach
The approach of this research consists of using volunteer network administrators

that are evaluated on their abilities to defend a network in a controlled environment.
Using, either, a desktop configuration or a Mobile Network Defense Interface (MNDI)
loaded with network interface software. The administrators will manage a network
during four test cases, each at a different LOA. Each test case consists of four
randomly generated cyber attack scenarios.
3.2.1

Network Interface.

3.2.1.1

Desktop.

The desktop interface consists of Spiceworks (Figure 3.1) which is a host
monitoring tool deigned to track the status of network assets [4]. The main source of
information presented to the administrator is an inventory of the test network assets,
related IP addresses, and functions of the servers. It also presents a log of actions
taken on the hosts and an up/down status.
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Figure 3.1: Spiceworks - Host Monitoring

SNORT [3] is the IDS that the administrator uses for network traffic analysis.
With Basic Analysis and Security Engine (BASE) (Figure 3.2) [1] as the Graphical
User Interface (GUI) for SNORT. This presents the administrator with alerts that
signal possible network attacks. Each attack is assigned a unique ID that will be used
to correlate user resolutions to a specific alert.
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Figure 3.2: Basic Analysis and Security Engine (BASE)

The network interaction window (Figure 3.3) is a custom application that was
written to give the administrator an interface to enter network action scripts and
SNORT alert IDs to resolve alerts and allow logging of all administrator actions.

Figure 3.3: Network Interaction Window

The alert resolution window (Figure 3.4) is how the administrator knows what
alerts have been resolved on the network. As the administrator and the automated
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system resolve the alerts from SNORT, this windows is updated with that information.

Figure 3.4: Alert Resolution Window

3.2.1.2

Mobile Network Defense Interface.

The mobile network controller is an iOS application written to interface with
the test network. It provides administrators with a GUI to interact directly with
the network and its automated systems [15]. The MNDI’s information windows
consist of network topology [Figure 3.5:#1], node health and link saturation
information [Figure 3.5:#2], action history log [Figure 3.5:#3], and the action/alert
window [Figure 3.5:#4].

The network topology displays the current network

connections with a visual indication of bandwidth saturation. Each node’s visual
representation indicates if it is a server, firewall or workstation and if it is currently
up or down. Tapping on each node shows an informational window which displays
the health of the node. The window contains the IP address, operating system,
CPU utilization, RAM, RAM unitized, network saturation, and packets lost rate
of the selected node.

The action history log is a list of alerts, administrator

actions, automated actions, and resolved alerts presented in a color coded list to the
administrator. It contains the unique alert ID, source and destination IP addresses
15

for the actions and alerts as well as a time stamp. The alert window contains the alert
ID, type of alert, source and destination IP addresses, and network impact rating.
The impact rating is a integer between 1 and 7, with one 1 representing the lowest
impact and seven 7 as the highest [Table 3.1].
The administrator interacts with the network through two separate windows, the
action and alert windows. Each network node has an associated action window that
list all available actions for the selected node. Once the administrator chooses an
action the appropriate script is generated and submitted for action. Th alert window
is displayed when a new network alert is generated. This window has the relevant
information about the alert as well as lists the appropriate actions for resolving the
alert. The ES’s suggested action is also highlighted in the window.

Figure 3.5: MNDI Interface
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Table 3.1: Impact Levels [27]
Impact
7

Description
Target host is vulnerable and attack results in high data
loss or service degradation

6

Target network contains hosts that are vulnerable and
attack results in high data loss or service degradation

5

Target host is vulnerable and attack results in moderate
data loss or service degradation

4

Target network contains hosts that are vulnerable
and attack results in moderate data loss or service
degradation

3

Target host is vulnerable and attack results in minor
data loss or service degradation

2

Target network contains hosts that are vulnerable and
attack results in minor data loss or service degradation

1

3.2.2

Target network is not vulnerable to attack vector

Automated System : Expert System.

The ES is integrated into the MNDI. Its decisions are based on a truth table
which is generated based on the cyber attack types that are used in the research.
The ES consists of:
• Alert monitoring processes that tracks current network alerts and generates
scripts to changes the network configuration based on the truth table.
• Level of Automation (LOA) system which will automate alert resolution based
upon the LOA setting and the alert’s impact on the network.
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• Script execution system.
The design and capabilities of the ES are not under study. This portion is built
from existing systems and research. The goal is to evaluate the most effective level
of assistance a ES system should provide, independent of the actual ES system. For
this research the ES reads in the list of alerts from the network modeler, discussed in
Section 3.2.3, and loads a list of actions that will resolve the alert from a truth table.
The ES then automates the response or generates a recommended actions biased on
the impact level of the alert and a threshold value given to the ES.
3.2.3

Network Modeler : Data Fusion.

Both the MNDI and the ES draw their data from a network modeler installed in
the test network [27]. This network modeler pulls its network picture and service list
from network scans performed by PBNJ [2]. The node health information is gathered
by a Java application that was installed on the network hosts [27]. The network
alerts are pulled from SNORT [3] and stored in the model under the associated node.
Each alert generated by SNORT is analyzed by the network modeler and assigned an
impact level based on the type of attack, if the target of the attack is vulnerable, and
if there are any nodes vulnerable to the attack. This impact level determines if the
ES automates the resolution or if it is presented to the administrator.
3.2.4

Test Network Configuration.

The test network, as shown in Figure 3.6, consists of four workstations, six servers
and the desktop and MNDI. The administrator will interact with the three windows
workstations, pfSense firewall, the Ubuntu web and FTP servers, and the Microsoft
Active Directory (AD) and Exchange server. The Spiceworks and network modeler
servers are responsible for supplying the network status to the administrator and the
BackTrack 5 workstation is running the software that generates cyber attack test
cases for the network.
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Figure 3.6: Test Network Diagram

3.2.5

Recoverability.

Once the test environment is configured, it is used in the same configuration for
all of the experiments performed. The network is built inside of a virtual environment
which allows the entire network to be reverted to a previous state. An automated
cyber attack generator is installed into the network to give the automated systems
and network administrators traffic and attacks to monitor and adapt to.
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3.3

System boundaries
The System Under Test (SUT) is the interaction of the LOA contained in the

ES and the network administrator, as shown in Figure 3.7. The network interface is
chosen randomly for each test subject. The type of interface is not under test but
both data sets will be examined to determine if the optimal LOA is dependent or
independent on interface type.

Figure 3.7: Network Attack Information Flow

The ES is responsible for monitoring and sorting incoming network alerts and
automating the resolution for the alerts that meet the impact threshold.

The

administrator is then presented with the alerts that fall below the LOA impact
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threshold (MNDI only) and with a list of alerts that were auto resolved (MNDI and
desktop interface). The Component Under Test (CUT) is the LOA in the ES which
controls the impact level threshold used to determine which alerts are automated.
The main limiting factors in this study are the size and complexity of the test
network and the number of test subjects able to be tested in the time allotted. To
keep the implementation of the network interfaces and the ES simple enough to be
completed in the time allotted simplistic cyber attacks and network configurations
are used. This could affect how the results translate to larger networks with more
elaborate automated systems and a broader scope of cyber attacks. The configuration
of the network is illustrated in Figure 3.6.
3.4

System Services
The ES sorts the alerts provided by the network modeler into two list; automated

response and user response. The automated response list is processed by the ES
and the appropriate response is taken. The user response list is presented to the
administrator with a recommendation provided by the ES (MNDI only). [Figure 3.8]
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Figure 3.8: Expert System (ES) Flow

3.5

Workload
The workload for the network consists of cyber attack scenarios among a

background of normal network traffic inherent in the test network. A test case is
run at each level of LOA. A test case is made up of four scenarios separated by a
randomly generated delay between 120,000 and 300,000 ms. Each scenario consists
of a random number of attacks between seven and twenty-five, and each attack is
delayed from the previous one by 0 to 10,000 ms. The test cases provide the ES
and the administrator alerts to respond to. The alerts are deliberately not covert
and do not try to evade the automated detection systems. Detection times are not
considered; only the time from alert to resolution is considered.

22

Table 3.2: Workload Parameters
Parameter
Delay Time between Scenarios
Number of Cyber Attacks in each Scenario
Delay Time between Cyber Attacks

3.6

Performance Metrics
The first two performance metrics are percentage of the alerts resolved and

percentage of user resolved alerts. These metrics show the effectiveness of the overall
system and if it can handle the supplied workload. The metrics used to determine
SA are the number of the administrator’s additional actions and percentage of user
alerts resolved. These metrics show the administrator’s involvement in the network
and demonstrated if the administrator was overwhelmed or not.

Table 3.3: Metrics
Metric
Percentage of Total Alerts Resolved
Percentage of User Alerts Resolved
Number of Administrator Actions

3.7

System Parameters
The following parameters can affect performance of the SUT.
• Types of Network Traffic: Certain types or combination of types of traffic could
give false positives or negatives as the IDS monitors for attacks.
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• Network Modeler: Different Network Modelers could interface differently with
the ES. Performance could be affected depending on the amount of processing
the ES has to do on the data provided.
• Types of IDSs: Different IDSs interfaces differently with the network modeler.
Performance could be affected depending on the amount of processing the
network modeler has to do on the data provided.
• Type of Network Interface: The administrator is randomly assigned to either
the desktop interface or the MNDI. The type of interface affects administrator
performance.
• Level of Automation: This is set to one of four levels and is the factor in this
experiment. The levels are 1, 5, 6, and 8.
• Number of Cyber Attacks per Scenario: The number of attacks must be high
enough to get a distinct difference, if one exists, between the different assistance
levels and administrator performance. However, not so high as to compromise
the normal function of the ES.
• Delay between Scenarios per Experiment: How much time the administrator
and the ES get to resolve the current alerts before the next set come in.
3.8

Factors
The factors in this experiment are the level of assistance provided by the ES,

Network Traffic Density, Number of Simultaneous Scenarios, and Level of Network
Operator Knowledge. Table 3.4 lists the factor levels and they are defined below.
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Table 3.4: Factor Levels
Factor

Level

Levels of Assistant

1, 5, 6, 8

Number of Cyber Attacks per Scenario

7-25

Type of Network Interface

Desktop or MNDI

Level

Varies between person. All volunteers fill out

of

Network

Administrator

Knowledge

3.8.1

a self assessment questionnaire

Levels of Automation.

The LOA are defined as follows: 1, 5, 6, 8. These are compared against the
alert’s impact level. At level 1 all alerts with impact 1 and higher are automated.
This means that the ES automates all the changes to the network in response to
an alert and then presents those decisions to the administrator. The administrator
can counter those changes or supplement the ES’s actions. At level 5 the ES will
automate approximately 75% of the network alerts, and the administrator is required
to respond to the others. The administrator is still free to change or supplement the
ES’s actions. At level 6 the administrator is required to handle the majority of the
alerts and the ES only handles alerts with an impact of 7. Level 8 is fully automated
with no automated actions.
A difference aries between the desktop and MNDI when interacting with the ES
at levels 5, 6, and 8. The MNDI has access to the ES recommend actions for each
alert that requires administrator action, where the desktop interface does not.
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3.8.2

Number of Cyber Attacks.

Number of Cyber Attacks per Scenario: This factor varies randomly from seven
to twenty-five, in order to measure the differences in the human-machine interaction
at different workload levels.
3.8.3

Type of Network Interface.

This factor varies to determine if the response variable is dependent on the type
of interface.
3.9

Evaluation Technique
Simulation is used to evaluate system performance. This is the best way to

control the other parameters values, prevent undesired fluctuations, and to make
sure the experiment and the results are repeatable. In a real world measurement
it is infeasible to control or account for the variations in network traffic that would
occur during the experiments. The simulation is configured as follows. The network
is a self contained virtual environment housed in a ESXi 5 server. The network is
built around a Microsoft 2008 active directory structure with Exchange 2010, web
services, and workstation machines. Once the network is configured, snapshots of all
the servers are taken and the entire network is cloned to ensure it can be restored to
its original state before each run.
3.10

Experimental Design

The network is composed of virtual machines running Windows 7, Windows
XP SP2, Windows Server 2008, BackTrack 5, and Ubuntu 12 with Active Directory,
Microsoft Exchange, Network Modeler, IDS, Web, and FTP network services. The
cyber attacks vary randomly in order, number, target IP, and destination IP. This
experiment is a classic block design with the network administrator and interface type
as the blocking factors.
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This experiment will be run as a within-subject study in a full-factorial design.
There will be nineteen administrators, each participating in four runs of the
experiment, one at each level of automated assistance.
3.11

Expriment Time Table

Each test subject who participates in this research is guided through the
procedure according to the following time table [Table 3.5]
3.12

Methodology Summary

The test network is a closed system with a limited number of nodes and attack
scenarios. The ES receives input from the network modeler and makes network
changes based on its truth table to eliminate the attack vectors.

The network

administrator has a set of visualizations and controls to interact with the ES and make
changes to the network. Each of the nineteen administrators perform the experiment
four times, each at a different assistance level. All of the attack scenarios between runs
and administrators are randomly generated. The data collected is used to determine
what level of automated assistance and human interaction maximizes SA during cyber
attacks and if the LOA is platform dependent.
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Table 3.5: Expriment Time Table
Stage

Description

Computer Network Pro-

A self assessment questioner used to de-

ficiency Assessment

termine administrator network experi-

Time in Stage
5 min

ence
Experiment Overview

An overview about why the experiment

5 min

is being conducted what it is trying to
achieve.
Training

This is the official training that the ad-

10 min

ministrator receives about the environment and the network interface they
are assigned.
Test Case 1

Run at a random LOA setting (1, 5, 6,

20 min

8)
Break
Test Case 2

5 min
Run at a random LOA, excluding the

20 min

LOA from Test Case 1
Break
Test Case 3

5 min
Run at a random LOA, excluding the

20 min

LOA from Test Case 1 and 2
Break
Test Case 4

5 min
Run at a random LOA, excluding the

20 min

LOA from Test Case 1-3
Network Tool Assess-

5 min

ment
Total

120 min
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IV.

Analysis of Results

This chapter discusses the distribution of automated alerts versus administrator
alerts. Additionally, it supplies evidence that the workload used in this study was
sufficient to overwhelm the administrator at the lower LOAs on both platforms.
Next it looks at the efficiency of the administrator-ES system on both platforms.
Specifically how does the efficiency change between the different LOAs and platforms.
Finally, it will look at how we can determine the administrator’s SA of the network
state.
4.1

Distribution of Work at LOAs
At LOA 1, 100% of the workload is placed on the ES. The administrator’s only

required task is to monitor the ES and report any errors that occur. The administrator
can execute any network actions they wish, but none are required to resolve alerts.
The administrator main task type is a vigilance task during the LOA 1 test case.
Human operators are not suited for this task, even at a short duration of twenty
minutes. It was observed that during the LOA 1 test case, administrators were
reading papers and talking with other people. There is even a case where the ES
failed and the administrator failed to notice, which will be shown later.
At LOA 5 and 6 there is a division of the workload between the ES and the
administrator. As shown in Figure 4.1 the division of labor for LOA 5 is 75% on
the ES and 25% on the administrator. The administrator is dealing with attacks of
impact four and lower, which were mailbox overflow attempts and internal Denial of
Service (DOS) alerts. Neither of these attacks is critical to the network and can be
dealt with or ignored without major consequences to the network.
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At LOA 6 there are very few attacks that have an impact of 7 so most of the
workload is on the administrator; 99.655% is on the administrator while less than 1%
is on the ES.

Figure 4.1: Percentage of Alerts Directed at Administrator Across Both Platforms
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As shown in Figure 4.2 the workload is balanced across both of the platforms.
The same system to generate the workload was used in the execution of all test cases.

Figure 4.2: Percentage of Alerts Directed at Administrator for LOA 5

Additionally, at LOA 6 [Figure 4.3] the workload is balanced across both of
the platforms. In this distribution at LOA 6 the MNDI received no alerts that
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were automated, making it the same as the fully manual LOA 8. The difference
in automation between the MNDI and the desktop is still within 1%.

Figure 4.3: Percentage of Alerts Directed at Administrator for LOA 5
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4.2

System Efficiency and Administrator SA
This section discusses the overall effectiveness of the administrator, the ES system

and how that changes between the two platforms with the various LOAs and how the
administrator’s SA is affected. It is shown that there is very little interaction at full
automation and the administrator is overwhelmed at the lower LOAs. There is a
large performance gap between the two platforms and that affects the conclusion as
to what LOA is the most effective.
4.2.1

MNDI.

The MNDI is a very effective platform when compared to the desktop. Even at
the lower LOAs the administrators resolved most of the alerts [Table 4.1] where the
desktop was consistently lower except for LOA 1 [Table 4.3] due to a failure on the
MNDI; without this outlier 99.295% of the alerts were resolved.

Table 4.1: MNDI: Percent Resolved and Administrators Additional Actions
{Outlier in LOA 1 removed}
LOA

Percent

Admin Additional Actions

LOA 1

99.296%

Admin #23 : 21 actions

LOA 5

96.44%

Admin #18 : 2 actions
Admin #24 : 1 action

LOA 6

68.528%

Admin #13 : 3 actions
Admin #23 : 3 Actions

LOA 8

67.027%

Admin #19 : 1 actions

At LOA 1 all of the alerts are resolved except for administrators 9 and
19[Figure 4.4]. Administrator 9 only had one alert unresolved and that is most likely
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a alert that came in just as the test case was concluding. For administrator 19,
there was a failure in the ES and they failed to identify it. This caused 67.5% of the
alerts to go unresolved. This demonstrates automation bias and lack of SA on the
network [Figure 4.5][Table 4.1].

Figure 4.4: MNDI: Alerts Resolved for LOA 1
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Figure 4.5: MNDI: Administrators Additional Actions Performed

At LOA 5, there were two administrators that performed additional actions [Figure 4.6][Table 4.1]. Furthermore the administrators were much more involved in the
network operations because they had to resolve approximately 25% of the alerts.
This indicates an increase of SA because of that involvement. LOA 5 also is shown
to be a well-balanced workload for those administrators because a mean of 96.44%
[Table 4.1]of the alerts were resolved, indicating that the administrators were not
overwhelmed.
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Figure 4.6: MNDI: Alerts Resolved for LOA 5

LOAs 6 and 8 were identical in the fact that there were no alerts automated by
the ES and both only had a mean of 67% of the alerts resolved [Table 4.1]. With
LOAs 6 and 8 both being fully manual we can see where the administrator starts to get
overwhelmed on the MNDI, which is around when the number of alerts reach between
seventy-five and one-hundred [Figure 4.7]. The reason there were no automated alerts
at LOA 6 is there is only one alert at a level seven and it was never detected by the
IDS during the MNDI test cases.
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Figure 4.7: MNDI: Alerts Resolved for LOA 6 and 8

As illustrated in the boxplot [Figure 4.8] and confirmed with a Wilcoxon Rank
Sum Test [Table 4.2], there is no statistical difference between LOA 1 and 5 or between
LOA 6 and 8. In LOA 6 and 8 we see the administrator getting overwhelmed as the
number of incoming alerts increases thus those LOAs decrease in effectiveness. We see
comparable performance at At LOA 1 and 5. LOA 1 will lead to greater automation
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bias and skill degradation, therefore LOA 5 is the best balance between manual and
automation for the MNDI.

Figure 4.8: MNDI: Difference in Performance by LOA

38

Table 4.2: MNDI: Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test H0 = Location Shift Equals 0
LOA vs LOA

4.2.2

P-value

Reject H0

LOA 1 vs 5

0.3839

No

LOA 1 vs 6

0.04216

Yes

LOA 1 vs 8

0.02177

Yes

LOA 5 vs 6

0.01106

Yes

LOA 5 vs 8

0.003266

Yes

LOA 6 vs 8

1

No

Desktop.

The desktop, with the exception of LOA 1, is a less effective platform for our
test cases. At LOA 1 the ES resolved all the alerts and the same ES is used in both
platforms. We only see a 5% difference from the MNDI to the desktop, discounting the
outlier in the MNDI data set. However, we see a significant difference in effectiveness
at LOAs 5, 6, and 8 across the platforms [Table 4.1][Table 4.3]. There is a 23%, 46%,
and 47% drop respectively between platforms at the same LOAs.
There is also a greater difference between the LOAs on the desktop then on the
MNDI. There is a 21% drop in alerts resolved between LOA 1 and 5 and a 52%
drop between LOA 5 and LOAs 6 and 8 where there is a 3% and 28% difference on
the MNDI. The desktop platform did elicit more additional administrator actions,
because of a lower automation bias. There is a distinct difference between the number
of additional actions performed and LOA settings, LOA 5 had the highest level of
user action followed by 6, 8 and 1 [Table 4.3][Figure 4.9].

39

Table 4.3: Desktop: Percent Resolved and Administrators Additional Actions
LOA

Percent

Admin Additional Actions

LOA 1

94.436%

Admin #21 : 3 actions

LOA 5

73.791%

Admin #11 : 6 actions
Admin #14 : 1 action
Admin #15 : 1 action
Admin #21 : 4 actions
Admin #22 : 18 actions

LOA 6

22.249%

Admin #11 : 4 actions
Admin #14 : 3 actions
Admin #22 : 7 actions

LOA 8

19.826%

Admin #17 : 1 action
Admin #22 : 11 actions
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Figure 4.9: Desktop: Administrators Additional Actions Performed

There are two factors that could have significantly attributed to the large
difference between LOA 1 and 5 [Figure 4.10]. The desktop interface can be confusing
because the administrator is required to correlate 3 different sets of information to
gain a clear picture of the network. It might take longer for the administrator to gain
SA on network operations. The only way to determine that is to run the study again
with a longer test case run time.
At LOA 1 we see only one administrator performing additional action where
at LOA 5 there are 5 administrators performing additional actions. This shows
that administrators were more active on the network at LOA 5, showing a reduced
automation bias, reducing the human out-of-the-loop performance problem and skill
degradation [Table 4.3][Figure 4.10][Figure 4.9]. A 74% resolution rate is too low to
be acceptable for defending a network. If we extrapolate the workload at a LOA of
4, we get a 15% workload instead of the 25% we see at LOA 5. This leads to the
conclusion that the best LOA is platform dependent.
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Figure 4.10: Desktop: Alerts Resolved for LOA 1 and 5

At LOA 6 and 8 the administrator is overwhelmed immediately, even when the
alert level is just over forty-five. Just like the during the MNDI tests, LOAs 6 and 8 are
statically the same [Figure 4.11][Figure 4.12][Table 4.4] and well below an acceptable
efficiency levels.
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Figure 4.11: Desktop: Alerts Resolved for LOA 6 and 8
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Figure 4.12: Desktop: Difference in Performance by LOA
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Table 4.4: Desktop: Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test H0 L̄ocation Shift Equals 0
LOA vs LOA

P-value

Reject H0

LOA 1 vs 5

0.0315

Yes

LOA 1 vs 6

0.02381

Yes

LOA 1 vs 8

0.01212

Yes

LOA 5 vs 6

0.002388

Yes

LOA 5 vs 8

0.000931

Yes

LOA 6 vs 8

0.8518

No
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V.

Conclusion

This research looked at the performance of the administrator with the ES and the
administrators SA throughout the experiment at varying LOA settings, workloads,
and among 2 different network interface platforms. The goal is to determine at what
LOA the performance and the SA of the administrator are preserved and if the optimal
LOA setting is platform dependent.
5.1

MNDI
The administrator could handle a workload of 25% and still perform at the

same level as when the alerts were fully automated.

When the administrator’s

workload was 100%, they were not overwhelmed until the alert count reached
seventy-five to one hundred. LOA 5 was shown to be the optimal level to keep
balance between performance and SA. The administrators were actively engaged in
network operations, preserving their SA and skills and reducing the out-of-the-loop
performance issue and automation bias.
The MNDI did introduce a higher level of automation bias than the desktop even
at the lower LOAs due to the recommended actions the ES produced for all manual
alerts. This was also evident in the number of additional actions. The administrators
responded to the MNDIs generated alerts very quickly and efficiently but did not
initiate a significant number of additional administrator actions.
5.2

Desktop
The 25% workload was overwhelming for the administrator even at low alert

counts. If the LOA was set to level 4 the workload would have been reduced to
15% and might have shown a more acceptable resolution percentage. Even at a
25% workload the administrators demonstrated a higher level of SA, shown by the
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number of additional actions. The automation bias was reduced because of the lack of
recommended actions as well as there was less skill degradation because the desktop
interface is more representative of the standard network system interface where the
MNDI is a unique interface to itself.
5.3

Conclusion
For the MNDI, LOA 5 was the optimal level of automation to preserve

performance and SA but it introduced a higher level of automation bias than the
desktop platform. LOA 5 on the desktop presented to great a workload for the
administrator to handle. LOA 4, which would have had a workload of about 15%
and might have been a more optimal choice. LOA 5 still out-performed the other
LOA setting and was better at preserving the administrators SA. The desktop also
reduced the automation bias as compared with the MNDI.
5.4

Future work
After experimenting with LOA settings at various workloads, and platforms it is

worth exploring if dynamic LOA setting would further improve performance and SA.
Implementing an artificial intelligence system to control the LOA would enhance the
systems ability to keep the administrator at optimal performance even with extreme
shifts in workload or changing interface platforms.
The interface platforms used in this research are representative of the new MNDI
capabilities and a open-source simple desktop interface. future work should expand
the scope of the network and focus on platforms that are used within DoD to show
that these conclusions hold for more complex desktop interfaces and where LOA might
prove an asset to the military mission.
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